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·In the Supreme Court
·of the State of Utah
ELLEN SMITH MOODY and CHARLES
MOODY, her husband,
Appellants and Plaintiffs,
vs.
JUANITA C. SMITH, individually, and
JUANITA C. SMITH, Guardian of the
Estate of DENNIS SMITH, a minor,
JOSEPHINE SMITH VODA, RACHEL
SMITH JENSEN, JOHN DOE and
RICHARD ROE, and all persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate
or interest in and to the real property
subject of this action,

Case No.
2100

Respondents and Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants' brief fairly states the nature of the case as
well as the facts as far as it goes. Appellants' and Respondents'
predecessor, David G. Smith, executed and entered into a lease
agreement December 1, 1950, containing the following provtston:
3
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(There is attached to this lease a Contract of Sale
· between the above parties II:J.arked Exhibit ttl"-, ·which
Contract of Sale by this reference is herein incorporated
and by these presents made a part hereof. It is mutually
agreed between the lessors and the lessee that in consideration of the foregoing covenants and agreements
of the parties, the lessee shall have, and he is hereby
granted, an option to purchase the foregoing interest
of the lessors in and to tbe above-described lands, rights,
p~rmits and pri~ile ges at a price and on the terms provtded on the satd Contract of Sale at any time during
the term of the foregoing lease.-'' (R. 23, 24). (Emphasis added.)
c

The lease also contains the following provision:
ttThis lease shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the heirs, successors and assigns of the respective parties." (R. 24.)
The term of this lease ran for a period of five years from
the first day of January, 1951, to the 31st day of December,
195 5 (R. 23). The facts undisputed by the evidence and pleadings show that David G. Smith, the respondent's deceased
husband, in his lifetime was in the process of acquiring the
sheep ranch of his father. Following the elder Mr. Smith's
death in 1925, his wife disposed of her dower interest in the
property by inter vivos transactions, and each of the five children, namely: David Smith, Rachael Jensen, Joseph Smith,
Josephine Voda and Ellen Moody, acquired an undivided onefifth interest therein (R. 5, 6). Thereafter, and prior to 1950,
Joseph Smith deeded his one-fifth interest to David Smith on
an exchange of property. The other sisters, Josephine, Rachael
and Ellen Moody (appellant). each sold their interest for the
san1e purchase price, $19,233 ..32. Josephine Voda's interest

4
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\vas an outright purchase, while Rachael and Ellen Moody's
interests were by lease and option to buy. Josephine and
Rachael have recognized the right of the respondent to purchase their interests and disclaimed any interest in this lawsuit (R. 41, 43). The only issue is \vhether or not Ellen Moody
and her husband are bound by the terms of the lease and the
option. Each of the family was treated equally and fairly by
David in acquiring the whole interest and for the same purchase price per sister and brother, namely: $19,233.32.
David Smith thereafter went into possession of the ranch
property pursuant to the terms of the lease on January 1,
1951, (R. 215) for a term of five years ending December 31,
1955, and during that tenn, he and his wife paid in excess of
$10,000.00 in real property taxes (R. 217) as provided by the
lease, as well as all the fees, levies and other assessments
that came due upon the land and the interest in grazing rights.
David G. Smith died in November of 1953 (R. 215), and
thereafter, his wife, Juanita C. Smith, on behalf of herself
and her minor child, Dennis C. Smith, exercised and executed
the option provided by the lease on October 11, 19 55, tendering
to the appellants the sum of $2,233.40, and likewise, tendered
the annual payments thereafter required by the option purchase
agreements, all of which were rejected and refused by the
appellants (R. 201, 202, 203, 204).
If ever a transaction was conspicuously clear and plain,
this is. The appellants executed a lease agreement with an
option attached in which no essential term was omitted; David
Smith agreed to lease for a term of five years. The annual
rental for the five year term of $604.38 payable November

5
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1st and June 15th of each year during the term of the lease.
Smith paid this rental. He also paid all taxes, fees, levies and
assessments. The lease was made binding upon the heirs,
successors and assigns of both parties. Smith was granted the
option to buy the lessors' (appellants') interest in the lands}
rights, per1nits and privileges at the price and on the terms
provided in the proposed contract at any time during the term
of the lease. The property was fully described as to metes and
bounds (R. 31, 32, 33, 34). After the trial court heard the
evidence and ruled in favor of the respondent on her Counterclaim and against the appellants on their Petition for Partition
(R. 83, 84), the respondent tendered, in open court, to the
appellants the sum of $18,306.88 (R. 104), which was the
total amount then due appellants for their interest in the
aforesaid property, less the attorneys' fees awarded by the
court, court costs awarded respondent, certain tax payment
credits to which appellants were entitled, less appellants'
share of bringing the abstract up to date, being a total net
amount due of $18,306.88 (R. 110). This tender likewise was
refused and rejected by the appellants (R. 265, 266).

RESPONDENTS' ANSWER TO APPELLANTS'
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL

I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING AND FINDING 'fHAT' APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT HAD EXFCU11ED AN OPTION ATTACHED TO THE LEASE.
6
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A.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR. IN FINDING AND
HOLDING THAT THE OPTION WAS ENFORCEABLE
AND SHOULD BE PERFORMED.

B.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT ADMITTING
THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH SMITH, ELLEN SMITH
MOODY AND CHARLES MOODY, TOGETHER WITH
EXHIBITS nA" ' ((B" ' "C" ' ((D" ' "E" ' nF" ' AND "G" .

C.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
9, 11 AND 12, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 1,
2 AND 3.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN I-IOLDING AND FINDING THAT APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT HAD EXECUTED AN OPTION ATTACHED TO THE LEASE.
Appellants' first point is totally untenable for the reason
that appellants admit in paragraph 1 of their Reply to respondent's Counterclaim:
7
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((That on or about December 1, 1950, she did enter
into a lease agreement with David G. Smith." (R. 39).
Appellants' argument in support of Point I is stated as follows:
·'This action centers around the question of whether
or not the document marked Exhibit '1' is a binding
option requiring Ellen Smith Moody to convey her
one-fifth ( 1-5) interest in the ranch to the Respondents
according to the terms of said Exhibit. * * * Appellants
contending that said document was nothing more than
a lease. * * * "
This argument departs entirely from the point which it is
supposed to prove. The point appellants attempt to make
is that no option with the contract to purchase had ever been
executed. Then the argument supporting Point I ends with
this statement:

·· * * * This general proposition is discussed under
the following points:"
Thereafter, follow appellants' Points A, B and C.
It will be noted that the foregoing bears no relation to
Point I or the arguments made in support thereof. Appellants
impliedly admit that an option was entered into, but assert
that it is impossible of performance and am~iguous, and
therefore. unenforceable.
Before proceeding to an examination of the foregoing
point, respondent calls attention to paragraph 2 of her Counterclaim (R. 21) \vherein it is alleged that respondent exercised
said option by tendering the amount to be paid as specified in
the option agreement, which tender was rejected and the
agreen1ent dishonored. On October 11, 1955, the respondent
n1ade her check payable in the amount of $2,233.-10. by \vhich
8
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she sought to exercise the option (R~ 204). On the following
year, October 29, 1956, respondent made payable and mailed
to appellants another check in the amount.of $2,568.88, which
was the first annual payn1ent required by the agreement. This
too v1as rejected (R. 204). Appellants, in replying to respondent's allegation, admitted that respondent did tender to the
plaintiff a sum of money and that appellants did refuse to
accept said sum of money.
Returning to Point A, appellants argue that the alleged
contract is impossible of performance because: ( 1) the contract bears date a year prior to the execution date of the lease;
( 2) the date of possession in paragraph 2 of the contract is
stated as being January 1, 1950; ( 3) the dates for paying
the purchase price are fixed as November 1, 1951, and November 1 each year thereafter; ( 4) delivery of an abstract
is set for July 1, 1951, and certification thereof is June 1, 195 5;

( 5) delivery of various documents is set for February 15, 1951;
( 6) payment of all taxes after January 1, 1950; ( 7) the date
of acknowledgment of the contract is, ((the ____ day of November,
1950."
As to Nos. 4 (delivery of the abstract) and 6 (payment
of taxes), there is no problem because the abstract has been
brought up to date, certified, paid for, and necessary credits
given, and is now in the possession of the respondents, and
she is satisfied therewith. All taxes have been paid and credit
given (R. 106). As to No. 7, this date is wholly imtnaterial
because the contract .was n~ver signed. It was n1erely tnad~ a
part of the lease agreement by reference ancl is totally integrated into the lease agreement and the option. The contract

9
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~ould not be . signed as .long as it remained executory.

The

option provision of the lease upon exercise thereof·_ by.' re~
spondent would simply ripen into an executed purchase con~
tract at any time during the .five year term of the lease, if so
exercised before December 31, 1955. When, on October 11,
1955, respondent exercised the option, then only did it become
an executed option, and none of its terms could have been
performed before that time and did not have to be pe1'formed
before that time. Murfee v. Porter, (Cal.), 214 P.2d 543.
None of the dates and confusion suggested by appellants
are in any sense ambiguous and impossible. They are merely
repugnant to the time of performance fixed in the lease, and
\Ve cannot agree with appellants that performance was predicated upon these dates. Their argument may be ignored since
these dates cannot be reconciled with the terms of the option
given to respondent in clear and unambiguous language.
There is a well established rule which disposes of such
a so·called problem as raised by the appellants:
"It has been laid down as elementary law that if two
clauses of an agreement are so totally repugnant to
each other that they cannot stand together, the first
shall be received and the last rejected, especially \vhen
the latter is inconsistent \vith the general purpose of
the instrument and would nullify it." 12 Am. Jur. 778,
779, Sec. 43; citing numerous cases in support of this
doctrine.
Throughout
the non Jequitor
show ·by parole
spondent had an

the trial and in appellants' brief, they assert
that it was the burden of the respondent to
and extrinsic evidence (R. 227) that reenforceable agreement. This argument n1ust
10
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fail for there is no ambiguity --between -the· integrated contract
and option here under: consideration. ·what we· have here are
two sets ·of phrases; expressed and clea~~ unambiguous terms
which cannot be reconciled. The first set contained a signed
and acknowledged lease, and we quote again in full:
((It is mutually agreed between the lessors and the
lessee that in consideration of the foregoing. covenants
and agreements of the parties, the lessee shall have,
and he is hereby granted, an option to purchase the
foregoing interest of the lessors in and to the abovedescribed lands, rights, permits and privileges at a
price and on the terms provided in the said contract
of sale at any time during the term of the foregoing
lease."
By the very term of this option, respondent would not be
entitled to a contract of sale of this property until he had exercised the option which was to remain open for five years, and
there is no evidence or pretense that respondent exercised his
option on the very day that the lease was signed by the parties.
So, the dates in Exhibit eel" are meaningless. However, it
was necessary to state the price to be paid for the property
under option, $19,233.32, the terms under which it might be
paid, namely: $1,888.88 per year, or more at buyer's option
(R. 27), the de~cription of the property sold, and other matters
which the parties deem necessary to consummate the deal.
All of these matters are fully set forth in Exhibit (( 1". There
is nothing ambiguous about the dates set forth in Exhibit
1",_ but t~ey are repugnant to th_e_ date~ Sf:t ou~ in th~ lease
and option and when rejected, as they m2:y .be,. the contract
becomes whole and meaningful.
H

11
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(When a. particular word,· or words, or the. contract
.as a ~hole,. is susceptible to ~o meanings, one of v1,hich
will uphold the contract and render ,i~ valid an~ ~n
forceable, and the other of which will destroy it· arid
render it invalid or ineffective, the former will be
adopted so as to uphold the contract, the parties having
presumed to having intended to make a binding contract." 17 C.J.S. 735, 736, Sec. 318.
c

This is especially true v1hen the contract is attacked by
one \Vho has been benefited thereby as have the appellants as
landlords for more than five years.
Cases are cited from nearly every jurisdiction upholding
this doctrine, including this Court:
((A construction giving instruments legal effect to
accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it can
reasonably be done and between two possible constructions, that will be adopted which establishes a valid
contract." Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retit'ement
Board, (Utah), 142 P.2d 657.
In Vance v. Arnold, (Utah) 201 P.2d 475, at page 479, this
court holds:

CWe conceive it our duty in interpreting the plans,
specifications and provisions which forn1 part of this
c

contract, to reconcile the provisions, if reasonably possible, so as to give effect to all and to construe the
con1plete contract to carry out its dominant purpose.
If t\VO interpretations are possible, one of \vhich would
lead to confusion, uncertainty or elimination of one
of the essential parts of the contract, and one ·which
\\'Ould harmonize all provisions of the ·rights, and
rnake the contract complete. fair and usual, the latter
interpretation should be preferred."
12
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. And, to the same effect, see Hardinge v. Eimco, (Utah)
266 P.2d 494; Morgan v. Fit'estone Tit'e, (Ida.) 201 P.2d 976;
Basler v. Warren, (C.C.A. TO), 159 F.2d 41.
Respondent submits that taking the words of this lease
and option in their ordinary and usual meaning, no substantive
clause must be allowed to perish by a strained construction,
and wherever possible, it is the duty of the court to prevent
the contract from perishing, or construing it so as its provisions are entirely neutralized.
Both of the parties entered into this lease and option
agreement with established and definite meaning, and both
parties were reasonably intelligent people acquainted with all
the operative usage of the terms ((lease and option," and must
have meant what they intended to mean in drafting these
instruments. In the absence of allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, the appellants cannot now argue that they
are not bound by this fully integrated agreement.
Should any question arise as to the sufficiency of the
consideration, Tilton v. Sterling (Utah), 77 Pac. 758, holds:
"The lease is the sufficient consideration to support
the option and lessor cannot withdraw it before the
time given to except it has expired."
In face of all this, the appellants now attempt to renege
and dishonor this agreement by asserting that prior parole
dealings should alter or vary the terms of the contract. The
hl\v is· against them.
See La1'son v. Smith (Iowa), 156 N.W. 813, holding:
13
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'(Lessor may not show by parole evidence that there
'vas· no consideration for an option to purchase which
is in the written lease where no mistake or. fraud is
pleaded."
See Hunter v. Farrell

(~LB.),

42 N.B. 323, holding:

((Lessor may not show by parole evidence that an
option to purchase in the lease was simply an agreement
to give' the lessee a preference if the lessor decided to
sell at the figure named.''
See Smith v. Caldwell (Ark.), 95 S.W. 467, holding:
CCA written contract for the rental or land with option
to purchase may not be shown by oral testimony to
have been intended to be a contract for sale."
And, Thomas v. Johnson (Ark.), 95 S.W. 468, to the same
effect; Barnhard v. Stern (Wis.), 196 N.W. 245; Bishop v.
Milton (Ark.), 152 S.W. 2d 299, holding:
(Parole evidence not admissible to show the parties
intended to make a different contract where the tenant
was given an option to purchase."
c

It follows, we believe, that appellants should be required
to specifically perform the contract, less the land withdrawn
through the prior transactions with the Moons in 1951 (R. 83),
which the trial court quite properly excepted, and which is
excepted from the deeds tendered to appellants for their
execution.
Appellants cite Bu1't t'. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143
Pac. 234, for a different purpose. That case recognizes all the
tenns of a contract as \vritten must be given full force and
effect when:
14
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. nin construing a contract, the words and .expressions
used by .the parties must be given full force and effect
unless to do so would lead to an ·absurdity, or is contrary to the manifest purpose or intention of the
parties." (p. 236).

RESPONDENT'S ANSWERS TO
APPELLANTS' POINTS B AND C
It has already been shown that the lease and option was
executed on December 1, 1950, and the Contract of Sale was
integrated within the lease and option as a part of it for the
purposes mentioned. It is obvious that testimony proffered by
Joseph Smith, Ellen Smith Moody or Charles Moody, her
husband, could have had no purpose whatever except to attempt
to vary the terms of a plain, clear, unambiguous written contract by parole. We believe it elementary that such testimony
n1ay not be received, and therefore believe that it is unnecessary
to further burden this Court with answering citations on the
Utah Dead Man's Statute. We do observe, however, that when
Ellen Smith Moody was called by the respondent as a witness,
the area of her testimony had to do entirely wit~ the question
of whether or not respondent had properly paid all taxes due
under the lease. It clearly appears from the transcript on the
trial that through appellants' own actions, tax notices for some
of this property were never delivered to Juanita C. Smith,
and therefore not paid by her. Appellants attempted to pay
these taxes themselves and use such payment as an excuse for
rejecting the lease. The tr~nscript shows clearly that had Ellen
Smith Moody not: attempted to circumvent these notices,. the
respondent would have paid them in due course (R. 218,
15
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219, 220, 22l). The Court has allowed respondent to tender

back to Mrs. Moody approximately $450.00 which represented
the amount of taxes paid by the appellants that should have
been directed to the respondent. The only purpose in offering
Mrs. Moody's testimony was to clear up the question of the
payment of these taxes, facts that arose after, not before, the
death of her brother, David.
It may be noted that all of the objections raised to the
offered testimony and exhibits, of which appellants now complain, were based not only upon the Dead Man's Statute, but
also upon the general objection that such testimony and exhibits
could not vary the terms of the lease and option, and that
such testimony and exhibits violated the parole evidence rule.
We believe these objections were properly sustained.
The lower court's Findings and Conclusions were proper,
and there was no error committed in such Findings and Conclusions.

CONCLUSION
Appellants should be required to specifically perform their
contract. They should be ordered to accept the $18,306.88
heretofore tendered by the respondent, and should be ordered
to execute, sign and deliver to the respondent the deeds prepared for their signature filed in this record. Respondent was
granted $1,000.00 attorneys' fee as provided for in said lease,
and herein urges that additional litigation caused by this appeal
justifies this Court in a\varding her an additional reasonable
attorneys' fee. Respondent contends that the trial court's

16
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1dgment should be affirmed in order that this case should
lOt lead to the kind of absurdity desired by appellants.
March 10, 1958.
Respectfully submitted,
DRAPER, SANDACK & DRAPER
By D. M. Draper and
A. W. Sandack
Attorneys for Respondents
405 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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RECEIVED----------:----------:----copies of the within Brief of
Respondent~;

this lOth day of March, 1958.
CLYDE & MECHAM
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Attorneys for Appellanis
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